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SikongJueluo
1afcbd3118
- require @gotgenes/pi-permission-system >=25.3.0 and read the complete local bash command from PromptPermissionDetails.payload instead of session-walking recovery - remove the @sikongjueluo/pi-permission-shared package - pass the triggering command unit to handlers via HandlerContext.unit in place of details.command - add shadow-only AI judge modules for evidence projection, structured verdict requests, and prompt building, with vitest coverage - record ADR 0004 and mark the ADR 0001 recovery mechanism superseded - exclude pi-permission-system 25.3.0 from the pnpm minimumReleaseAge guard
62 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
62 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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status: accepted
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---
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# Defer `env` to the AI judge; inner-cmd never unwraps it
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`env` is the second command type considered for `pi-permission-inner-cmd`'s
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deterministic unwrapping. We decided inner-cmd **always defers** `env` — it
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never strips modifiers or re-evaluates an inner command — and lets the AI judge
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authority handle `env` commands together with their full environment context.
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## Why
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`env` is a *non-transparent wrapper*: its modifier args (`NAME=VALUE`, `-i`,
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`-u`, `-C`, `-S`) form an unbounded, implicit input channel that the
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command-string policy cannot see. Stripping them and re-evaluating the inner
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command is unsound, because the modifiers can change what actually runs without
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changing the inner command string:
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- `PATH=/evil` — resolve the inner name to a different binary;
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- `LD_PRELOAD=/x.so`, `LD_LIBRARY_PATH` — inject arbitrary native code into the
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inner binary before its `main()`;
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- `BASH_ENV`, `PYTHONPATH`, `NODE_OPTIONS`, `PERL5OPT`, … — source scripts or
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inject code into the inner command's runtime;
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- `-i`, `-u NAME`, `-C DIR` — alter the execution context.
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A "detect dangerous variables and defer" denylist is infeasible: the dangerous
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set is open-ended (new runtimes keep introducing new `*_OPT` / `*_PATH`
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injection variables), so any denylist is permanently incomplete, and one miss is
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an RCE. Detecting "does *any* modifier exist" is trivial and complete, but the
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only sound unwrap case is bare `env <cmd>` (zero modifiers), which is too rare in
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practice to justify the shell parsing it would require (assignment/flag
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detection, `-S`, `--`, `/usr/bin/env` basename, quoting).
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## Considered options
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- **Detect a `PATH=` override, otherwise unwrap** — rejected as false security:
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`LD_PRELOAD` and the interpreter-injection variables defeat it without
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touching `PATH`.
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- **Unwrap only bare `env <cmd>` (zero modifiers)** — sound, but bare `env` is
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rarely written and the boundary parsing adds real complexity for near-zero
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coverage. Not worth it.
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- **Always defer (chosen)** — zero parsing risk, zero soundness surface;
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non-transparent commands get the semantic judgement they require from the AI
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judge.
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## Consequences
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This establishes a clean division between the two permission authorities:
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- **inner-cmd (deterministic)** unwraps only *transparent* wrappers (`timeout`)
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— sound, fast, narrow. Every uncertain or non-transparent command defers
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fail-closed.
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- **The AI judge authority** receives deferred commands (including `env`) and
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reasons about the full command *with* its environment, where non-transparency
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can be understood semantically rather than stripped.
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This is why the AI judge consumes the complete command from permission-system's
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structured prompt payload (ADR 0004) — it needs the complete input, modifiers
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included, to judge non-transparent wrappers. See `CONTEXT.md` for the transparent /
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non-transparent wrapper distinction.
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