diff --git a/CONTEXT.md b/CONTEXT.md
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@@ -5,6 +5,22 @@ extensions that inspect and re-evaluate Bash commands before they are allowed.
 
 ## Language
 
+### Authority
+
+**Enforce authority**:
+Allow-only delegation — when the Judge's verdict is `allow` and every gate in
+the Enforce truth table passes, the command runs without the human dialog. The
+Judge can never answer `deny` with authority; every uncertain case (defer,
+deny, preflight, infrastructure failure) falls back to the human dialog.
+_Avoid_: AI takeover, auto-deny, full delegation
+
+**Audit log (Judge-owned)**:
+The Enforce-era accountability record written by the Judge package itself —
+separate file from the permission-system review log, append + fsync per
+record, self-checked for health; an unhealthy audit log refuses authority.
+_Avoid_: host contract (dropped — see ADR 0006), acknowledged write (upstream
+sense)
+
 ### Wrappers
 
 **Wrapper**:
diff --git a/docs/adr/0006-enforce-audit-self-sufficiency.md b/docs/adr/0006-enforce-audit-self-sufficiency.md
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+---
+status: accepted
+---
+
+# Enforce audit self-sufficiency — no upstream host contract
+
+PIEXTENSIO-10 (promotion governance) and PIEXTENSIO-13/15 (host contract
+and enforce gates) conditioned the allow-only Enforce authority on a
+formal **host contract** in upstream `@gotgenes/pi-permission-system`:
+acknowledged review writes, capability versioning, pre-link enrollment,
+and a LocalUserAuthorizer-only human-decision marker. We decided to drop
+that dependency: every guarantee Enforce needs will be **provided by the
+Judge package itself**, and the upstream stays untouched at zero changes.
+
+## Why the original design was wrong
+
+Not "too early" — structurally wrong. Every contract item is complexity
+the upstream maintainer must carry **forever**, serving a plugin he does
+not use. His own users gain nothing from it. A PR of that shape sits in
+the queue forever (observed: upstream has unprocessed PRs already).
+Designing our audit needs as host obligations is asking someone else to
+pay for our feature.
+
+The "self-recording is untrustworthy" argument also failed scrutiny under
+the actual threat model: this Judge runs on the operator's own machine,
+single-user. The Judge can be *buggy* but has no motive to *deceive*.
+Bugs are covered by in-process self-checks; "independent third-party
+audit" is an enterprise-multi-tenant requirement we do not have.
+(The original patches were also lost with `~/Projects/.workspace/`
+cleanup and were never pushed — the dependency was not just unwanted but
+gone.)
+
+## What self-sufficiency means concretely
+
+1. **Judge-owned audit log**, separate file from the permission-system
+   review log (which also solves an operational pain: that log is ~850KB
+   of mixed events). Append + fsync per record; a failed write marks the
+   runtime **unhealthy**, and the Enforce truth table's telemetry gate
+   refuses authority while unhealthy. This is the self-implemented
+   version of "acknowledged writes".
+2. **Human-decision attribution at the consumption side.** Real-human
+   decisions are distinguishable by event shape
+   (`approved`/`denied` from the dialog vs `session_approved`/
+   `auto_approved`/`infrastructure_auto_allowed`), verified against live
+   data in the 2026-08-17 TUI cohort (round 5 showed forwarded
+   `auto_approved` double-writes). The analyzer filters cohort rows on
+   this shape instead of the upstream marking humans.
+3. **Denominator redefined** as "asks the Judge itself received"
+   (waiting rows in the Judge log), not upstream pre-link enrollment.
+   Self-consistent bookkeeping; the PIEXTENSIO-10 floor math applies to
+   this denominator unchanged.
+4. The truth-table gate `hostContractPresent` becomes a **local
+   self-check gate** (audit log healthy). Mechanically identical in
+   effect: today's production state already defers unconditionally.
+
+## What is explicitly not weakened
+
+- The PIEXTENSIO-10 floor (100 qualified rows, zero false allows,
+  per-segment) stands, computed on the self-owned log.
+- Allow-only semantics stand: the Judge never denies; every uncertain
+  case defers to the human dialog.
+- Fail-closed stands: audit unhealthy → defer; malformed evidence →
+  defer; unknown state → defer.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- PIEXTENSIO-15 is cancelled (single-consumer upstream feature =
+  unmaintainable dependency). Its lessons stay here.
+- If the upstream ever ships an equivalent contract on its own
+  initiative, the Judge may adopt it later; nothing in this design
+  blocks that. Revisit trigger: multi-user / multi-tenant deployments
+  where the "buggy-but-honest" threat model no longer holds.
+- Promotion cohort identity is unaffected (model/prompt/evidence
+  profile); the audit-log switch is a governance-consumer change.